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This paper studies the effect of employer-provided training on the probability
of subsequent job exit. Empirical evidence usually shows that the probability
of receiving training by the employer is higher among those employees with
the lowest expected rates of turnover. Therefore, it seems that firms provide
training selectively. In this paper, we address the empirical question of to
what extent this endogeneity problem leads to a spurious correlation between
training receipt and job mobility. Using Spanish Data from the European
Community Household Panel, we provide estimates that ignore the selec-
tion bias and compare the results with the ones obtained when correcting for
the possible nonrandom selection between trainees and non-trainees. Over-
all, our results show that there is a negative correlation between on the job
training and job mobility, but only for fired workers, and not for voluntary
movers. Nonetheless, once the endogeneity problem is accounted, the neg-
ative effect becomes statistically nonsignificant for all types of movers.
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T his paper studies the effect of employer-provided training on the probability ofsubsequent job exit. It is a widely held view that firms’ provided training is cru-cial to improve long-term economic performance. Moreover, a significantamount of schooling takes place once the individual has entered in the labourmarket, so training is relevant both for employees and employers. Sieben
(2007) summarizes some of the reasons that explain the importance of firm-provided
training. She emphasizes that training makes workers perform better in their jobs [Bar-
tel (1995)], helps to adequate the skills acquired during initial education to skills re-
quired at the job [De Grip et al. (1998)], is an instrument to prevent skills obsolescence
[Bishop (1997)], and improves workers’ employability by increasing their career op-
portunities both inside and outside the firm [Groot and Maasen van den Brink (2000)].
(*) We are grateful to Olympia Bover, Juan José Dolado, and two anonymous referees for comments
on a previous draft of this paper. The second author acknowledges research funding from the Span-
ish Ministry of Science and Innovation, Grant No. ECO2012-31358. All remaining errors are our own.
One of the main concerns with regards to the investment in training by firms
is that it can be under its optimal level. The argument commonly used to explain this
under-investment is the so called “poaching problem”, that is, the probability that
employees leave the firm after receiving the training and, thus, firms loose the op-
portunity to recover their investment. According to this, standard human capital the-
ory argues that firms will only bear the cost of firm-specific training and not of gen-
eral training. Nonetheless, in practice, employers usually bear part of the costs of
general training, which is consistent with recent training literature that assumes im-
perfectly competitive labour markets. In any case, the absence of data on key theo-
retical constructs of the theory –general training, specific training, or productivity
growth– implies that the only predictions of the theory that can be accurately tested
relate to the effects of formal training on variables like wages or turnover. In this pa-
per we focus on job mobility and our purpose is to address the empirical question
whether those employees who receive training in their firm paid by the employer are
more prone to quit, rather than testing different theories.
To address this question it is important to note that firms typically provide train-
ing to their employees selectively. This can be due to the above mentioned risk of
losing the returns of training or because employers are better at assessing the abil-
ity of workers than the econometrician and provide training to those workers who
are highly able. This implies that participation in training is not distributed at ran-
dom. Furthermore, there might be factors unobserved by the econometrician –like
aspirations, motivations and ambitions– that influence both training participation and
job mobility behavior. This is the so called “selection bias problem”, which implies
that those workers who receive training would behave differently from those who do
not, independently of any true causal effect of training on job mobility. In short, it
is very likely that the probability of training receipt and the probability of subsequent
job exit are not independent one to another. This endogeneity may lead to a spuri-
ous correlation between both variables.
Most of the empirical research on the effect of employer-provided training on
subsequent job mobility have adopted a sequential approach in which typically the
question to answer is the following: if an individual receives training in period t, how
does his probability to move from his job in period t+1 vary? A consistent finding
of the empirical models which do not account for the previous endogeneity problem
is that training has a negative effect on job mobility. However, this result only has a
causal interpretation if it is assumed that there are not unobserved determinants of
mobility that also determine previous training participation. As emphasized before,
this is difficult to maintain.
In this paper we present estimates that show the importance of accounting for
the selection problem, pointing out that lack of control of endogeneity could lead to
misleading policy recommendations. Using Spanish data from the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP), we focus on the effect of what the ECHP calls “vo-
cational training”, because only in this case we have information on whether or not
the training has been paid by the employer. We present separate estimates for work-
ers who leave the firm voluntarily and fired workers in order to account for the po-
tential observed and unobserved differences between these two groups of “movers”.
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To quantify the causal effect of training receipt on job mobility we treat these
two variables as discrete. However, as opposed to the case of continuous variable
models, instrumental variable methods are inappropriate for analyzing the relation-
ship between two endogenous discrete variables [see Manski et al. (1992)]. Given
this, we our preferred estimates are based on a switching probit model with endo -
ge nous switching. Although there are also nonparametric alternatives to estimate
these types of models [see Manski (1990)], prior information assumptions are nec-
essary if one is to do more than bound the probabilities. For that reason, our identi-
fication strategy is based on assumptions about the probability distribution of the en-
dogenous variables, and also on exclusion restrictions that will help to identify the
parameters of the model. Specifically, we use lagged values of the training variables
as predetermined instruments and also information on whether or not the individual
speaks a second language as an external instrument.
Our results show when the endogeneity problem is not accounted for that
there is a negative effect of employer-paid training on job mobility, although this ef-
fect is only statistically significant for fired workers, and not for voluntary movers.
However, once we account for the possible self-selection of the trainees, the nega-
tive effect of training on job mobility becomes statistically non-significant in all
cases. Therefore, we do not find evidence that the training itself reduces the likeli-
hood of leaving the job. There are other unobserved characteristics potentially cor-
related with training participation that need to be taken into account in order to have
useful estimates of the effect of training on job mobility.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the related liter-
ature; Section 2 presents the econometric model and the identification strategy; Sec-
tion 3 describes the data set used; Section 4 contains the estimation results; and, Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
1. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE EFFECT OF TRAINING ON JOB MOBILITY
There are a number of theories as to why workers change jobs. Many studies
on training and job mobility take the Human Capital Theory [Becker (1964)] as a
starting point. According to this theory, it is crucial the distinction between general
and firm-specific training. Specific training increases an individual’s productivity
only at the firm in which the individual is employed, while general training also in-
creases his productivity in other firms. In this setting employees alone pay for the
costs of general training, while costs of firm-specific training are shared by both the
worker and the firm. In this model investment on training is on its optimal level and
specific training should unambiguously be associated with lower turnover rates while
it is not expected any effect of general training on the employees’ inclination to quit.
This theory, however, is based on the assumption that labour market is perfectly
competitive. Alternative theoretical models relax this assumption. According to
these models employers would be willing to bear part of the costs for general train-
ing. This is the case, for example, of Stevens (1994), Katz and Ziderman (1990) or
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). The first one assumes imperfect competition in the
labour market while the others assume informational asymmetries. In these more re-
alistic frameworks deviations from the optimal level of training are possible and both
general and specific training could be related to job mobility.
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From an empirical point of view, several papers have tried to analyze the rela-
tionship between general or specific training and job mobility. Using data from call
centre agents in the Netherlands, Sieben and De Grip (2004) estimate logistic mod-
els and obtain that only firm-specific training decreases inclination to quit for another
job inside the sector. Green et al. (2000), by the estimation of ordered probit mod-
els, show that firm-specific training has a negative impact on job mobility in Britain,
while general training has a non-significant impact.
It must be noted, however, that many available data sets do not distinguish between
general and specific training. Moreover, in practice most of the training is a blend of
specific and general training. For this reason many empirical studies focus on who pay
for or/and organize the training offered to the employees. Some examples are Parent
(2003), Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (2003), Elias (1994) and Lynch (1991).
Using Canadian data, Parent (2003) estimates a Cox proportional hazard model
and finds a negative relation between the receipt of employer supported training and
the breakdown of the labour relation. Zweimüller and Winter-Ebmer (2003), using
data from Switzerland, distinguish between “employer-provided” and “self-fi-
nanced” training. The first one is associated with firm-specific training and the sec-
ond one is associated with general training. By the estimation of probit models they
find that firm-specific training induces lower mobility for women, while there is no
significant impact of general training. For Great Britain, Elias (1994) estimates logit
models for the probability of a job completion. The results point to a negative effect
of training on female labour mobility, while for males the effect is barely significant.
In turn, Lynch (1991) focuses on the determinants of leaving an employer among
young workers in their first years of work in the United States. By the estimation of
Cox proportional hazard models, the results show that those workers who had some
formal “on-the-job training” were less likely to leave their employer, while those who
participated in some form of “off-the-job training” were more likely to leave.
One of the major drawbacks of some of the existing literature is that training
is treated as an exogenous determinant of job mobility and the reverse-causation
problem is not controlled for. As pointed out by Card and Sullivan (1988), the mea-
surement of training effects in the absence of random assignment into trainees and
non-trainees groups is extremely difficult. Some studies address this issue within a
duration model framework and account for unobserved effects correlated with train-
ing and mobility by modelling individual-specific baseline hazards [see, for instance,
Korpi and Mertens (2003), Parent (2003) or Elias (1994)]. Some other authors, like
Veum (1997), account for the endogeneity problem using as instruments for train-
ing variables related to institutional characteristics of the individual’s locality try-
ing to reflect the individual’s potential access to training. By the estimation of Cox
proportional hazard models, he provides only limited evidence that training reduces
turnover. Nonetheless, the instruments used for identification in Veum’s paper are
only moderately successful in predicting training receipt. Within a different frame-
work, Sieben (2007) studies the effect of training on search behavior by estimating
logit models. She controls for selectivity by applying Heckman two-steep methods
using as exclusion restrictions variables related to the previous educational level of
the individual. Her results show that there is no significant self-selection for men,
while for women she did not find any variable which affects training and not search
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behavior. Another possibility is to rule out the unobserved effects using a first-dif-
ferences approach [see Greenhalgh and Stewart (1987)]. Nonetheless, this approach
has greater potential to further enhance any measurement errors present in the data
and moreover, it is not straightforward to apply in non-linear models.
In this paper we use an identification strategy based on the estimation of a
switching probit model with endogenous switching. As there is no obvious identify-
ing restriction that could be used to perform over-identification tests, we use the non-
linearity of the model as the minimum identifying assumption. Nevertheless, identi-
fication based solely on arbitrary functional form assumptions is fragile. In this sense,
the presence of a regressor in the training equation that does not directly affect the mo-
bility decision could improve identification of the parameters of the model1. Altonji
and Shakotko (1987), in the context of the effect of tenure on wages, propose using
the variation of tenure over a job match as instrumental variable for tenure. Parent
(1999) extends this methodology to the study of the effect of training on wages. How-
ever, given the discrete nature of our endogenous variables, this approach is not valid
for us, since there is no enough variation in that instrument to explain the training vari-
able. We have, therefore, relied on a distributional assumption element using in addi-
tion some exclusion restrictions to identify the parameters of the model. Specifically,
we try to capture certain aspects of the ability of the worker that could influence on
the training probability using information on whether or not the individual speaks a
second language. Moreover, we take advantage of the panel structure of the data and
use also two lagged values of the training variables as predetermined instruments.
2. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The empirical question of interest is whether training causally affects job mobil-
ity. To measure this effect it is useful to define two hypothetical mobility outcomes,
M0 and M1. Each worker, i, is characterized by values of the variables (Mi1, Mi0, Ti, xi).
Variable Mi1 indicates the outcome if the individual were to take the training course:
Mi1 = 0 if the individual does not move and Mi1 = 1 otherwise. Similarly, Mi0 indi-
cates the outcome if the individual were not to participate in the training program.
Here x is a vector of individual and job characteristics. The binary variable T indi-
cates training participation in the previous period and is defined as Ti = 1 if the in-
dividual participates and Ti = 0 otherwise.
We can measure the effect of training on job mobility for a particular individual
by the difference Pr(Mi1 = 1|xi)-Pr(Mi0 = 1|xi). It measures how a particular individ-
ual would change job mobility behavior if his training behavior switched from Ti = 0
to Ti = 1. However, for each individual we only observe the value of Mi1 or Mi0, and
the other value is censored. As pointed out by Manski et al. (1992), the sampling
process generating the data only identifies the conditional probabilities Pr(Mi1 = 1|xi,
Ti = 1) and Pr(Mi0 = 1|xi, Ti = 0). Therefore, in the absence of prior information, the
data cannot identify the parameters of interest, Pr(Mi1 = 1|xi) and Pr(Mi0 = 1|xi).
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(1) As Dearden et al. (1996) recognize it is difficult to suggest variables which are correlated with
training but not with mobility. Thus, in practice, identification would be through functional form as-
sumptions.
One solution to this identification problem, typically used in linear models, is to
use the standard two-stage or instrumental variables method. Nevertheless, the pres-
ence of a dummy endogenous regressor in a binary choice model makes the analysis
differ substantially from that in continuous variable models. More precisely, the stan-
dard two-stage method leads to an inconsistency with the statistical assumptions of the
nonlinear discrete models. Moreover, the alternative linear probability model is in-
compatible with the observed data when dummy endogenous regressors are present
in a binary choice model [see Carrasco (2001) for a detailed discussion on this issue].
Given this problem, the identification of the effect of training on job mobility
depends crucially on the available prior information to the econometrician. As in Car-
rasco (2001), that prior information about the joint probability distribution of (Mi1,
Mi0, Ti) is expressed through the formulation of a trivariate probit model.
Let us then consider the following switching probit model for N individuals:
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(2) This model is similar to the one estimated by Manski et al. (1992) in the context of the effect of
family structure during adolescence on high school graduation.
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where Γ is the indicator function, α1, α0 and β are vectors of coefficients which include
a constant term, Mi is the observed job mobility outcome for individual i, and q is a
vector of variables which can include an exclusion restriction. We assume that (ui1, ui0,
ε1) are jointly normally distributed with zero mean vector and covariance matrix.
We estimate several models which differ in their assumptions about the co-
variance matrix of the disturbances. The most general one does not impose any re-
strictions on the covariance matrix (ui1, ui0, ε1)2. This is a switching probit model with
endogenous switching. This is our preferred model since training participation and
job mobility outcomes may be jointly determined by processes that cannot be directly
observed. In the context of the latent-variable model previously presented, this
means that the disturbances (ui1, ui0, ε1) are statistically dependent. Notice that the
standard bivariate probit arises as an especial case in which ρ0ε = ρ1ε.
As emphasized before, within this framework, the main problem we face is
given by the fact that the data are not able to identify Pr(M1 = 1|x) and Pr(M0 = 1|x).
Given that the two variables of interest, mobility and training, are discrete, one can
not apply the standard two stage IV approach as in continuous variable models. The
reason is that since training is a binary indicator its distribution cannot be normal,
and as a consequence, two-stage or instrumental-variable methods are not valid al-
ternatives for estimating this type of nonlinear models. Hence, as it is pointed out
by Manski et al. (1992), the possibilities for inference depend critically on the as-
sumptions about the distribution of the disturbances of the model, as well as on the
available prior information about the process generating the outcomes of interest. In
this paper, we assume that the disturbances are distributed trivariate normal and also
use some exclusion restrictions to improve the identification of the causal effect of
interest. In particular, we use an “external” instrument given by an indicator of whether
or not the individual speaks a second language. We also use as instruments lagged
values of the training variable. Notice that by using predetermined instruments we
account for the potential persistence in the training variable. The identifying as-
sumption behind is that, once we account for current training, there is no a direct ef-
fect on mobility between t and t+1 of having received training in t-1 and before. The
only effect of training in t-1 and before is through its effect on training in t3.
Dropping out the individual subscripts, the log-likelihood function of the mo -
del, from which maximum likelihood estimates can be obtained, is as follows:
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(3) This assumption is standard in the panel data literature.
(4) This data set has been also used, for instance, by Arulampalam et al. (2010) to study the effect of
training for workers at different quantiles of the wage distribution in ten European Union countries.
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Notice that the model which assumes that ε is statistically independent of (u1, u0),
imposes that training is exogenous to job mobility (that is to say, ρ1ε = 0 and ρ0ε = 0).
This assumption would mean that the unobserved factors that affect job mobility and
training are uncorrelated. In that case, the sampling process would be able to iden-
tify the probability of interest, Pr(M = 1|xi, Ti), and the parameters can be estimated
by maximizing the binary probit likelihood. This model is estimated as a benchmark.
3. DATA DESCRIPTION
The data come from the last two waves of the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP) corresponding to years 2000 and 2001 for Spain4. This is a longitu-
dinal data set which allows us to measure the effect of training in one period on labour
market status in subsequent periods5. Every year the selected households are inter-
viewed about issues relating to demographics and labour market behavior.
Our sample comprises individuals employed in the first wave. Specifically, we
select those employees who declare that are normally working 15 or more hours per
week in 2000. We focus on this group because some important variables for the
analysis, as tenure or firm size, are only available for individuals working 15 hours
or more. We eliminate those in self-employment and those working with an employer
in paid apprenticeship. We also exclude employees in the agricultural sector and those
over 60 years old (in order to mitigate the effect of job exit due to retirement). The
final sample size is 2,707 observations.
The dependent variable is an indicator of job mobility. It takes the value 1 for
those individuals that in the second wave are not in the same job held in the first one.
This definition of the job mobility variable is adopted, for example, by Elias (1994)
or Mincer and Jovanovic (1981), and implies that it takes value 1 also for individu-
als who move to unemployment or inactivity. It must be noted, however, that the most
common movement is to another job (66.0% versus 13.4% who become unemployed
and 20.6% who leave the labour market)6. On the other hand, in the case of the move-
ments to another job, we have also used information on tenure in order to capture
exits from the firm and not changes of job within the same firm, which are not rel-
evant in this context. On the whole, 22.6% of the individuals change their labour sit-
uation between the two waves. We have also performed separate estimates that ac-
count for the reason why the workers leave the job. Specifically, we estimate a model
in which the mobility variable takes the value 1 for movers who have been fired (these
are 12.6% of the sample), and another model for those who have voluntarily left the
firm, who represent 9.8% of the sample.
With respect to the training variable, the ECHP distinguishes between “general”
and “vocational” courses. We focus on vocational training because only in this case
we know if the training has been paid and/or organized by the employer7. We define
training to take the value 1 if the individual has received such training since Janu-
ary in the previous year, and 0 otherwise. About 10.3% of individuals in the total sam-
ple have received vocational training paid or organized by their employer8, while this
figure is 11.2% and 11.7% for the subsamples used to estimate the models for fired
workers and voluntary movers, respectively.
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(5) We restrict the analysis to the last two waves of the survey because the focus of our research is
to analyze endogeneity issues, and we want to keep a homogeneous sample without the potential in-
fluence of business cycle effects.
(6) We have also considered a different measure of job mobility which excludes those individuals who
move to unemployment or inactivity. The results, available upon request, do not change.
(7) The type of information on general training available in this data set does not allow us to analyze the
effect of this type of training. The definition of “general training” in this survey is just referred to sec-
ondary and university education, and this is not the type of general training that it would be of interest
for us. We focus on the training received on the job and paid by the employer because we are interested
on the problem faced by the employers if they lose the returns to the investment on certain workers.
(8) The distribution of the type of vocational training, according to the information in the survey, is the
following: (i) specific vocational training at a vocational school (24.6% of the total sample), (ii) specific
vocational training within a system providing both work experience and a complementary instruction else-
where (6.8%), (iii) specific vocational training in a working environment (60.7%), and (iv) other (7.9%).
The explanatory variables used in the estimation refer to socio-demographic
variables related to the individual and to variables related to the job and the firm in
which the individual was employed in the first wave9. With respect to socio-demo-
graphic characteristics we include dummy variables for gender, marital status, and
for the presence of children under the age of 12. We also take into account the age
(4 dummies) and the educational level (3 dummies) of the individual according to
the International Standard Classification of Education. The characteristics of the job
held in the first wave are included in terms of the type of contract (temporary or not),
part-time or full-time employment, and tenure. We also account for the job status us-
ing three dummies variables indicating if the job held by the employee is (i) super-
visory; (ii) intermediate; or (iii) non-supervisory. Firm’s characteristics, such us pri-
vate or public sector and service sector are also included. We capture the size of the
firm through three dummy variables which take the value 1 for small (less than 100
employess), medium (between 100 and 500 employess), and large firms (with more
thant 500 employess), respectively10.
The sample characteristics are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. Table 1 offers de-
scriptive information for what we called “total sample”, which is used for the esti-
mations in which the mobility variable does not distinguish between fired workers
and voluntary movers. Tables 2 and 3 correspond to the samples used to estimate the
models for fired workers and for voluntary movers, respectively11. Means are cal-
culated for the whole sample and by sub-samples of trained and non-trained and
workers who have changed their labour situation and those who haven’t.
We observe that job change is more frequent among those that have not received
training and that the percentage of trained is higher among those who have not change
their labour situation. This points to a negative relationship between employer-pro-
vided training and subsequent job exit, for the three samples considered. If we com-
pare trained and non-trained sub-samples we can see that in the first group there are
relatively more women. Also, this group of individuals are relatively older, more ed-
ucated and with more tenure in their current job. On the contrary, in the non-trained
sub-sample there are relatively more temporary workers. With respect to the job sta-
tus, this is higher among the trained group as well as the percentage of public and
service sector and large firm employees. Comparing the employees who change their
labour situation with those who haven’t changed it we see that “movers” are rela-
tively younger, less educated and with less tenure. They are more often temporary
workers and held lower positions in their firms which, also, tend to be smaller. Fi-
nally, they are to a lesser extent employees in the public or service sectors.
Measuring the impact of on the job training on job mobility
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(9) Other variables, like the quality of the training programs, could also be relevant to explain the ef-
fect of training on job exit. Unfortunately, in our data set we do not have this information.
(10) Notice that there could be other unobservable variables of the firm potentially correlated with
the error term of the model. Nonetheless, given the characteristics of the data set, it is difficult to deal
with them. One possibility could be to include firm’s specific fixed effects, but this would require hav-
ing data in which the cross sectional unit was the firm and not the individual.
(11) Notice that we do not use exactly the same individuals since for the last two samples we need
information about the reason why the worker left the firm, which is missing for some individuals of
the total sample and we have preferred to keep as many individuals as possible in the total sample.
We have performed estimates usging exactly the same observations and the results do not change.
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Table 1: SAMPLE MEANS. TOTAL SAMPLE
TOTAL T = 1 T = 0 M = 1 M = 0
Training 0.103 (0.30) – – 0.031 (0.17) 0.126 (0.33)
Mobility 0.226 (0.42) 0.068 (0.25) 0.244 (0.43) – –
Gender and family
Women 0.366 (0.48) 0.414 (0.49) 0.361 (0.48) 0.396 (0.49) 0.358 (0.48)
Married 0.664 (0.47) 0.750 (0.43) 0.654 (0.48) 0.548 (0.50) 0.698 (0.46)
Children 0.339 (0.47) 0.389 (0.49) 0.333 (0.47) 0.318 (0.47) 0.345 (0.48)
Age
16 – 25 0.113 (0.32) 0.028 (0.17) 0.123 (0.33) 0.229 (0.42) 0.079 (0.27)
26 – 35 0.331 (0.47) 0.293 (0.46) 0.335 (0.47) 0.393 (0.49) 0.313 (0.46)
36 – 45 0.295 (0.46) 0.404 (0.49) 0.282 (0.45) 0.198 (0.40) 0.323 (0.47)
46 – 60 0.261 (0.44) 0.275 (0.48) 0.260 (0.44) 0.180 (0.38) 0.285 (0.45)
Education
Less than upper secondary 0.456 (0.50) 0.175 (0.38) 0.488 (0.50) 0.565 (0.50) 0.424 (0.49)
Upper secondary education 0.195 (0.40) 0.200 (0.40) 0.195 (0.40) 0.172 (0.38) 0.202 (0.40)
Tertiary education 0.349 (0.48) 0.625 (0.48) 0.317 (0.47) 0.263 (0.44) 0.374 (0.48)
Tenure
Until 3 years 0.453 (0.50) 0.189 (0.39) 0.483 (0.50) 0.768 (0.42) 0.361 (0.48)
4 – 6 years 0.106 (0.31) 0.129 (0.34) 0.103 (0.30) 0.082 (0.27) 0.113 (0.32)
7 or more years 0.441 (0.50) 0.682 (0.47) 0.414 (0.49) 0.150 (0.36) 0.526 (0.50)
Contract
Temporary 0.277 (0.45) 0.100 (0.30) 0.297 (0.46) 0.592 (0.49) 0.185 (0.39)
Part-time 0.048 (0.21) 0.014 (0.12) 0.052 (0.22) 0.072 (0.26) 0.042 (0.20)
Job status
Supervisory 0.079 (0.27) 0.161 (0.37) 0.070 (0.25) 0.042 (0.20) 0.089 (0.29)
Intermediate 0.189 (0.39) 0.282 (0.45) 0.178 (0.38) 0.100 (0.30) 0.215 (0.41)
Non-supervisory 0.732 (0.44) 0.557 (0.50) 0.752 (0.43) 0.858 (0.35) 0.696 (0.46)
Sector
Services 0.625 (0.48) 0.782 (0.41) 0.607 (0.49) 0.552 (0.50) 0.646 (0.48)
Public sector 0.248 (0.43) 0.421 (0.49) 0.228 (0.42) 0.175 (0.38) 0.270 (0.44)
Size
Small 0.693 (0.46) 0.525 (0.50) 0.712 (0.45) 0.768 (0.42) 0.671 (0.47)
Medium 0.164 (0.37) 0.239 (0.43) 0.155 (0.36) 0.144 (0.35) 0.169 (0.38)
Large 0.143 (0.35) 0.236 (0.43) 0.133 (0.34) 0.088 (0.28) 0.160 (0.37)
Instruments
Training t-1 0.102 (0.30) 0.350 (0.48) 0.073 (0.26) 0.054 (0.23) 0.115 (0.32)
Training t-2 0.118 (0.32) 0.325 (0.47) 0.094 (0.29) 0.049 (0.22) 0.138 (0.34)
Second language 0.148 (0.36) 0.306 (0.46) 0.130 (0.34) 0.139 (0.35) 0.151 (0.36)
Nº observations 2,707 280 2,427 611 2,096
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source: Our estimations using ECHP.
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Table 2: SAMPLE MEANS. FIRED WORKERS
TOTAL T = 1 T = 0 M = 1 M = 0
Training 0.112 (0.31) – – 0.023 (0.15) 0.125 (0.33)
Mobility 0.126 (0.33) 0.026 (0.16) 0.138 (0.35) – –
Gender and family
Women 0.365 (0.48) 0.414 (0.49) 0.359 (0.48) 0.417 (0.49) 0.358 (0.48)
Married 0.677 (0.47) 0.754 (0.43) 0.668 (0.47) 0.536 (0.50) 0.698 (0.46)
Children 0.342 (0.47) 0.396 (0.49) 0.336 (0.47) 0.328 (0.47) 0.345 (0.48)
Age
16 – 25 0.097 (0.30) 0.026 (0.16) 0.106 (0.31) 0.222 (0.42) 0.079 (0.27)
26 – 35 0.324 (0.47) 0.287 (0.45) 0.328 (0.47) 0.397 (0.49) 0.313 (0.46)
36 – 45 0.306 (0.46) 0.414 (0.49) 0.293 (0.46) 0.192 (0.39) 0.323 (0.47)
46 – 60 0.273 (0.45) 0.273 (0.45) 0.273 (0.45) 0.189 (0.39) 0.285 (0.45)
Education
Less than upper secondary 0.449 (0.50) 0.176 (0.38) 0.483 (0.50) 0.619 (0.49) 0.424 (0.49)
Upper secondary education 0.197 (0.40) 0.205 (0.40) 0.196 (0.40) 0.162 (0.37) 0.202 (0.40)
Tertiary education 0.354 (0.48) 0.619 (0.49) 0.321 (0.47) 0.219 (0.41) 0.374 (0.48)
Tenure
Until 3 years 0.420 (0.49) 0.179 (0.38) 0.451 (0.50) 0.834 (0.37) 0.361 (0.48)
4 – 6 years 0.109 (0.31) 0.131 (0.34) 0.106 (0.31) 0.080 (0.27) 0.113 (0.32)
7 or more years 0.471 (0.50) 0.690 (0.46) 0.443 (0.50) 0.086 (0.28) 0.526 (0.50)
Contract
Temporary 0.247 (0.43) 0.090 (0.29) 0.267 (0.44) 0.682 (0.47) 0.185 (0.39)
Part-time 0.043 (0.20) 0.011 (0.11) 0.047 (0.21) 0.056 (0.23) 0.042 (0.20)
Job status
Supervisory 0.081 (0.27) 0.153 (0.36) 0.072 (0.26) 0.023 (0.15) 0.089 (0.29)
Intermediate 0.197 (0.40) 0.291 (0.46) 0.185 (0.39) 0.073 (0.26) 0.215 (0.41)
Non-supervisory 0.722 (0.45) 0.556 (0.50) 0.743 (0.44) 0.904 (0.30) 0.696 (0.46)
Sector
Services 0.631 (0.48) 0.784 (0.41) 0.612 (0.49) 0.523 (0.50) 0.646 (0.48)
Public sector 0.259 (0.44) 0.422 (0.49) 0.238 (0.43) 0.182 (0.39) 0.270 (0.44)
Size
Small 0.682 (0.47) 0.519 (0.50) 0.703 (0.46) 0.761 (0.43) 0.671 (0.47)
Medium 0.166 (0.37) 0.246 (0.43) 0.156 (0.36) 0.146 (0.35) 0.169 (0.38)
Large 0.152 (0.36) 0.235 (0.42) 0.141 (0.35) 0.093 (0.29) 0.160 (0.37)
Instruments
Training t-1 0.106 (0.31) 0.358 (0.48) 0.074 (0.26) 0.040 (0.20) 0.115 (0.32)
Training t-2 0.126 (0.33) 0.328 (0.47) 0.100 (0.30) 0.043 (0.20) 0.138 (0.34)
Second language 0.147 (0.35) 0.291(0.46) 0.129 (0.33) 0.119 (0.32) 0.151 (0.36)
Nº observations 2,398 268 2,130 302 2,096
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source: Our estimations using ECHP.
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Table 3: SAMPLE MEANS. VOLUNTARY EXITS
TOTAL T = 1 T = 0 M = 1 M = 0
Training 0.117 (0.32) – – 0.048 (0.21) 0.125 (0.33)
Mobility 0.098 (0.30) 0.040 (0.20) 0.106 (0.31) – –
Gender and family
Women 0.358 (0.48) 0.408 (0.49) 0.352 (0.48) 0.364 (0.48) 0.358 (0.48)
Married 0.681 (0.47) 0.750 (0.43) 0.672 (0.47) 0.531 (0.50) 0.698 (0.46)
Children 0.340 (0.47) 0.386 (0.49) 0.333 (0.47) 0.289 (0.45) 0.345 (0.48)
Age
16 – 25 0.096 (0.29) 0.026 (0.16) 0.105 (0.31) 0.250 (0.43) 0.079 (0.27)
26 – 35 0.321 (0.47) 0.279 (0.45) 0.327 (0.47) 0.399 (0.49) 0.313 (0.46)
36 – 45 0.310 (0.46) 0.412 (0.49) 0.297 (0.46) 0.193 (0.40) 0.323 (0.47)
46 – 60 0.273 (0.45) 0.283 (0.45) 0.271 (0.44) 0.158 (0.37) 0.285 (0.45)
Education
Less than upper secondary 0.435 (0.50) 0.177 (0.38) 0.469 (0.50) 0.531 (0.50) 0.424 (0.49)
Upper secondary education 0.201 (0.40) 0.202 (0.40) 0.201 (0.40) 0.193 (0.40) 0.202 (0.40)
Tertiary education 0.364 (0.48) 0.621 (0.49) 0.330 (0.47) 0.276 (0.45) 0.374 (0.48)
Tenure
Until 3 years 0.399 (0.49) 0.184 (0.39) 0.428 (0.49) 0.754 (0.43) 0.361 (0.48)
4 – 6 years 0.111 (0.31) 0.118 (0.32) 0.110 (0.31) 0.088 (0.28) 0.113 (0.32)
7 or more years 0.490 (0.50) 0.698 (0.46) 0.462 (0.50) 0.158 (0.37) 0.526 (0.50)
Contract
Temporary 0.220 (0.41) 0.092 (0.29) 0.237 (0.43) 0.548 (0.50) 0.185 (0.39)
Part-time 0.045 (0.21) 0.015 (0.12) 0.049 (0.22) 0.075 (0.26) 0.042 (0.20)
Job status
Supervisory 0.087 (0.28) 0.158 (0.37) 0.078 (0.27) 0.062 (0.24) 0.089 (0.29)
Intermediate 0.205 (0.40) 0.287 (0.45) 0.194 (0.40) 0.118 (0.32) 0.215 (0.41)
Non-supervisory 0.708 (0.45) 0.555 (0.50) 0.728 (0.45) 0.820 (0.38) 0.696 (0.46)
Sector
Services 0.636 (0.48) 0.756 (0.42) 0.618 (0.49) 0.544 (0.50) 0.646 (0.48)
Public sector 0.256 (0.44) 0.415 (0.49) 0.235 (0.42) 0.136 (0.34) 0.270 (0.44)
Size
Small 0.679 (0.47) 0.522 (0.50) 0.700 (0.46) 0.754 (0.43) 0.671 (0.47)
Medium 0.168 (0.37) 0.243 (0.43) 0.158 (0.37) 0.158 (0.37) 0.169 (0.38)
Large 0.153 (0.36) 0.235 (0.42) 0.142 (0.35) 0.088 (0.28) 0.160 (0.37)
Instruments
Training t-1 0.110 (0.31) 0.357 (0.48) 0.078 (0.27) 0.057 (0.23) 0.115 (0.32)
Training t-2 0.128 (0.33) 0.324 (0.47) 0.102 (0.30) 0.035 (0.18) 0.138 (0.34)
Second language 0.151 (0.36) 0.301 (0.46) 0.132 (0.34) 0.158 (0.37) 0.151 (0.36)
Nº observations 2,324 272 2,052 228 2,096
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Source: Our estimations using ECHP.
With respect to the instruments used, and in particular to the second language
indicator, on the whole sample 14.8% of the individuals declare speaking a second
language. As mentioned, we use this variable as an instrument in the estimation. There-
fore, it should be desirable that it was correlated with the training but not with the mo-
bility variable, once current training is taken into account. In this sense, if we com-
pare the trained and non-trained sub-samples we can see that the percentage of
individuals speaking a second language is higher among those who have received
training (30.6% versus 13.0%). On the contrary, the percentage of individuals speak-
ing a second language among employees who change their labour situation is quite
similar to that for those who have not change it (13.9% versus 15.1%)12. As explained,
with this instrument we try to capture certain aspects of the ability of the worker that
could influence on the training probability. Finally, the sample means for the lagged
values of the training variable, which complement the set of instruments, suggest a
high persistence in this variable.
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
In this section we report the estimates from the different models previously de-
scribed. We present and compare two sets of estimates: one from the model that treats
training as strictly exogenous and another one from the model that accounts for the
endogeneity of training participation. We perform both set of estimates for the total
sample and for the sub-samples of fired workers and voluntary movers separately. For
models in which endogeneity is accounted for, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
ρ1ε = ρ0ε, therefore we only report estimates imposing this restriction. In principle we
allow all the parameters in the equation for M1 to differ from those in the equation
for M0 (α1 ≠ α0). Nonetheless, we do not obtain significant differences among them,
except for the constant term, which measures the effect of training. For that reason,
we only present the results for which only the constant differs in both equations.
The qualitative impact of the variables is discussed in terms of the sign and sta-
tistical significance of the estimated coefficients. In order to assess the economic sig-
nificance of the effects we also report predicted probabilities. Specifically, to eval-
uate the effect of training participation on the exit probability, we calculate the
average effect for all individuals. For each individual we compute
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(12) The p-values associated with a test on the equality of means between groups are 0.000 for the
trained vs. non trained comparison and 0.476 for the “movers” vs. “stayers” comparison.
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where N is the total number of individuals considered (the whole sample, or the sam-
ple for fired workers and voluntary movers respectively). Then, the average effect
of training participation is given by
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present maximum likelihood estimates for the three samples
considered. The results from the model that treats training participation as strictly
exogenous (Column 2) reproduce previous evidence based on simple correlation that
receiving training reduces the probability of moving. Nonetheless, we only find that
this effect is statistically significant for the whole sample and for the sample of fired
workers. For the sample of voluntary movers we do not find any significant corre-
lation between training and mobility. The predicted probabilities, shown in Table 7,
indicate that training participation reduces the probability of job turnover by ap-
proximately 5.6 percentage points for those workers that have been fired. This ef-
fect is consistent with the observation typically found in the literature that training
participation is negatively correlated with job mobility, reflecting the fact that em-
ployers wish to retain more highly trained workers, although our results only point
to a significant negative effect for the sample of fired workers.
However, at least part of this negative correlation could be due to an endoge-
nous training participation effect. Column 4 in Tables 4, 5, and 6, and Table 7, show
that when endogeneity is accounted for, the effect of training participation becomes
statistically non-significant for all the samples considered. The contrast between these
two sets of estimates suggests that at least part of the negative relation between train-
ing and job mobility is due to the effect of unobserved characteristics of the trainees
that are correlated with the unobserved variables that affect job mobility. In other
words, once the possible spurious correlation is accounted for, we find that those who
acquire training are not more likely to leave the job13. This result is in line with Veum’s
(1997), who find only limited evidence that company training reduces turnover.
Therefore, we find evidence that the probability of mobility for trainees and non-
trainees that does not account for the selection issue would be biased.
Regarding the rest of covariates, we obtain similar effects from exogenous and
endogenous estimates. We find interesting to point out the differential effect of the
variables for gender, age, and education on the probability of receiving training and
on the probability of being a voluntary mover. Tenure has also a negative effect on
the probability of leaving the firm, while the probability of receiving training is pos-
itively related to job tenure. As pointed out by Vaum (1997) this positive relation-
ship is inconsistent with the human capital model, which predicts that all training
should be concentrated at the start of the employment relationship. Nevertheless, it
could be the case that firms delay training until there is some certainty that the cost
of training can be recovered. Regarding the type of contract, those individuals with
a fixed-term contract are less likely to be trained by the employer, and these indivi -
duals are precisely the ones with a higher probability of job turnover, ceteris paribus.
Individuals in the public and service sectors are more likely to receive training, but
there is no significant effect of these variables on the probability of moving jobs.
Moreover, the size of the firm has a positive effect on training participation, although
this variable is not significant at explaining job mobility. Finally, family composi-
tion is not significantly related to the acquisition of training.
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(13) The estimates that do not include among the set of instruments the second language indicator
are very similar, although statistically less significant.
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Table 4: ESTIMATED COEFFCIENTS. TOTAL SAMPLE
Training as exogenous Training as endogenous
(ρ1ε = ρ10 = 0) (ρ1ε = ρ10)
(1) Training eq. (2) Mobility eq. (3) Training eq. (4) Mobility eq.
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Training -0.432 -3.27 -0.290 -0.58
Gender and family
Women 0.034 0.41 0.074 1.12 0.032 0.40 0.073 1.07
Married -0.022 -0.22 0.033 0.43 -0.022 -0.21 0.033 0.42
Children 0.028 0.30 0.025 0.34 0.028 0.30 0.024 0.33
Age
26 – 35 0.179 0.97 -0.186 -1.93 0.177 0.90 -0.187 -1.89
36 – 45 0.266 1.35 -0.384 -3.46 0.261 1.24 -0.387 -3.42
46 – 60 0.162 0.79 -0.240 -2.01 0.157 0.71 -0.241 -1.97
Education
Upper secondary education 0.272 2.45 -0.159 -1.90 0.270 2.39 -0.163 -1.89
Tertiary education 0.487 4.90 -0.143 -1.85 0.487 4.90 -0.155 -1.80
Tenure
4 – 6 years 0.349 2.56 -0.267 -2.61 0.354 2.39 -0.274 -2.65
7 or more years 0.358 3.17 -0.595 -6.91 0.363 3.00 -0.603 -6.44
Contract
Temporary -0.164 -1.31 0.686 9.64 -0.164 -1.14 0.687 9.35
Part-time -0.399 -1.65 0.021 0.16 -0.395 -1.60 0.028 0.21
Job status
Intermediate -0.169 -1.33 -0.257 -1.69 -0.173 -1.37 -0.250 -1.80
Non-supervisory -0.255 -2.16 -0.016 -0.11 -0.260 -2.29 -0.007 -0.05
Sector
Services 0.195 2.05 -0.045 -0.65 0.196 1.94 -0.047 -0.68
Public sector 0.052 0.58 0.069 0.82 0.052 0.58 0.065 0.74
Size
Medium 0.287 3.02 0.012 0.14 0.284 2.85 0.007 0.08
Large 0.173 1.75 -0.088 -0.88 0.171 1.71 -0.092 -0.89
Instruments
Training in t-1 0.684 7.28 – – 0.683 7.41 – –
Training in t-2 0.417 4.49 – – 0.412 4.56 – –
Second language 0.262 2.86 – – 0.267 2.86 – –
Constant -2.214 -9.69 -0.414 -2.36 -2.209 -9.53 -0.422 -2.55
Correlation coefficient – -0.078
(t-ratio) (-0.31)
Log-likelihood -1,916.14 -1,916.07
Nº observations 2,707 2,707
Source: Our estimations using ECHP.
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Table 5: ESTIMATED COEFFCIENTS FOR FIRED WORKERS
Training as exogenous Training as endogenous
(ρ1ε = ρ10 = 0) (ρ1ε = ρ10)
(1) Training eq. (2) Mobility eq. (3) Training eq. (4) Mobility eq.
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Training -0.411 -1.61 -0.487 -0.72
Gender and family
Women 0.040 0.48 0.163 1.91 0.041 0.49 0.163 1.82
Married -0.026 -0.25 -0.048 -0.50 -0.026 -0.24 -0.047 -0.46
Children 0.033 0.34 0.061 0.65 0.032 0.32 0.061 0.64
Age
26 – 35 0.151 0.74 -0.081 -0.67 0.152 0.71 -0.080 -0.66
36 – 45 0.235 1.10 -0.280 -1.99 0.236 1.05 -0.278 -1.94
46 – 60 0.103 0.46 -0.012 -0.08 0.105 0.45 -0.011 -0.07
Education
Upper secondary education 0.278 2.44 -0.241 -2.16 0.279 2.41 -0.238 -2.01
Tertiary education 0.480 4.67 -0.293 -2.69 0.480 4.66 -0.286 -2.35
Tenure
4 – 6 years 0.358 2.53 -0.224 -1.73 0.355 2.28 -0.220 -1.65
7 or more years 0.349 2.96 -0.769 -6.38 0.346 2.69 -0.765 -5.42
Contract
Temporary -0.197 -1.48 0.799 8.87 -0.198 -1.28 0.797 8.55
Part-time -0.498 -1.80 -0.231 -1.32 -0.497 -1.79 -0.234 -1.28
Job status
Intermediate -0.160 -1.21 -0.118 -0.45 -0.160 -1.21 -0.121 -0.57
Non-supervisory -0.263 -2.13 0.229 0.91 -0.262 -2.18 0.224 1.09
Sector
Services 0.207 2.09 -0.052 -0.58 0.205 1.95 -0.051 -0.55
Public sector 0.064 0.70 0.081 0.73 0.065 0.70 0.083 0.70
Size
Medium 0.308 3.14 0.087 0.79 0.308 3.00 0.089 0.78
Large 0.173 1.69 -0.031 -0.24 0.173 1.68 -0.030 -0.21
Instruments
Training in t-1 0.732 7.54 – – 0.733 7.72 – –
Training in t-2 0.393 4.11 – – 0.393 4.22 – –
Second language 0.212 2.17 – – 0.212 2.15 – –
Constant -2.152 -8.88 -1.145 -3.44 -2.152 -8.83 -1.141 -4.71
Correlation coefficient – 0.042
(t-ratio) (0.12)
Log-likelihood -1,373.42 -1,373.41
Nº observations 2,398 2,398
Source: Our estimations using ECHP.
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Table 6: ESTIMATED COEFFCIENTS FOR VOLUNTARY EXITS
Training as exogenous Training as endogenous
(ρ1ε = ρ10 = 0) (ρ1ε = ρ10)
(1) Training eq. (2) Mobility eq. (3) Training eq. (4) Mobility eq.
Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio
Training -0.183 -1.16 -0.352 -0.55
Gender and family
Women 0.029 0.35 0.008 0.10 0.031 0.38 0.009 0.10
Married -0.033 -0.34 0.037 0.36 -0.032 -0.30 0.036 0.35
Children 0.018 0.19 -0.048 -0.49 0.017 0.18 -0.046 -0.46
Age
26 – 35 0.206 1.03 -0.238 -1.94 0.207 0.98 -0.235 -1.85
36 – 45 0.295 1.41 -0.419 -2.91 0.297 1.33 -0.412 -2.73
46 – 60 0.191 0.88 -0.363 -2.31 0.190 0.81 -0.361 -2.20
Education
Upper secondary education 0.263 2.31 -0.041 -0.38 0.263 2.27 -0.035 -0.31
Tertiary education 0.480 4.70 -0.088 -0.88 0.480 4.63 -0.072 -0.62
Tenure
4 – 6 years 0.289 2.02 -0.257 -1.94 0.288 1.82 -0.249 -1.81
7 or more years 0.342 2.96 -0.547 -4.84 0.338 2.67 -0.534 -3.99
Contract
Temporary -0.101 -0.76 0.518 5.62 -0.099 -0.65 0.516 5.38
Part-time -0.374 -1.50 0.089 0.52 -0.380 -1.45 0.079 0.43
Job status
Intermediate -0.153 -1.18 -0.316 -1.83 -0.151 -1.16 -0.325 -1.80
Non-supervisory -0.232 -1.92 -0.136 -0.89 -0.229 -1.94 -0.148 -0.90
Sector
Services 0.189 1.94 -0.064 -0.71 0.191 1.86 -0.060 -0.65
Public sector 0.043 0.47 -0.084 -0.72 0.043 0.46 -0.080 -0.64
Size
Medium 0.280 2.86 0.081 0.74 0.283 2.75 0.089 0.75
Large 0.143 1.41 0.040 0.30 0.143 1.40 0.045 0.30
Instruments
Training in t-1 0.723 7.51 – – 0.722 7.68 – –
Training in t-2 0.406 4.26 – – 0.413 4.45 – –
Second language 0.278 2.89 – – 0.272 2.80 – –
Constant -2.191 -9.10 -0.730 -3.66 -2.194 -9.07 -0.721 -3.40
Correlation coefficient – 0.097
(t-ratio) (0.28)
Log-likelihood -1,330.27 -1,330.21
Nº observations 2,324 2,324
Source: Our estimations using ECHP.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Understanding the relationship between on the job training and job turnover is
crucial for developing appropriate human resources policies aimed at increasing the
skills of employees. A common finding in this literature is that training reduces
turnover. However, most of the empirical research on the effect of employer-provided
training on subsequent job mobility doesn’t take into account that firms provide train-
ing selectively, in the sense that employers offer training courses to those workers
they wish to retain.
In this paper we argue that at least part of the negative relation between train-
ing and job mobility could be due to the characteristics of trained employees instead
to a true causal effect of training on turnover. In statistical terms we argue that train-
ing could be an endogenous variable in a job mobility equation and not a strictly ex-
ogenous one. We have shown the importance of this question by the estimation of
different models. Specifically, we present and compare two sets of estimates: one
from a model that treats training as exogenous and another one from a model that
accounts for the endogeneity of training participation.
The main conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that there is a negative
effect of training participation on job mobility when the endogeneity problem is not
accounted for, although it seems important to distinguish between the reasons why
the worker leaves the firm. Specifically, for those workers who abandon voluntarily
the firm, we do not find a statistically significant correlation between on the job train-
ing and job mobility. Only for the sub-sample of fired workers there is a statistically
significant negative correlation between the two variables. Nonetheless, once we ac-
count for the possible self-selection of the trainees, the negative effect of training on
job mobility disappears in all cases, and becomes statistically non-significant.
Our results that do not account neither for the endogeneity of training nor for the
distinction between voluntary or involuntary exits, are in line with Parent (2003), Dear-
den et al. (1996), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999), or Elias (1994). Nonetheless, in
some of the previous works, the estimated effect is not significant [i.e. Loewenstein
and Spletzer (1999)], or it is significant only for women [i.e. Elias (1994) or Lynch
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Table 7: AVERAGE ESTIMATED EFFECT OF TRAINING ON THE PROBABILITY OF JOB EXIT
Training as exogenous Training as endogenous
Total sample pi (t-ratio) -0.095 -0.066
(-3.78) (-0.63)
Fired workers pi (t-ratio) -0.056 -0.065
(-1.96) (-0.89)
Voluntary exits pi (t-ratio) -0.025 -0.045
(-1.27) (-0.66)
Source: Our estimations using ECHP.
(1991)]. Our results on the lack of significance of the effect of training when self-se-
lection is accounted for is in line with Veum (1997), although our results are nor di-
rectly comparable, since he estimates a duration model and only find a significant ef-
fect for highly educated workers with more than one year of tenure. Our estimates that
account for the type of exit are in line with Sieben (2007), who uses the search be-
havior as an indicator for the voluntary exits.
The complexity in the link between on the job training and job mobility sug-
gests that one should be cautious when moving from the results to policy implica-
tions. According to our results, it seems crucial to take into account the potential en-
dogeneity between these two variables, otherwise one could attribute to training an
effect which is due to other unobserved characteristics of the workers and, therefore,
propose misleading policy recommendations.
Our results should be complemented by further analyses. First, we have only
considered binary indicators of training and mobility and analyze the impact of re-
ceiving training on the probability of moving. Nonetheless, it could be the case that
it is the accumulation of training, rather than just a recent episode that affects job
turnover. Moreover, another measure of job mobility that could be considered is the
number of jobs an individual has held at any point in time.
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RESUMEN
Este trabajo estudia el efecto de la formación ofrecida por el empleador so-
bre la probabilidad de abandonar la empresa. Típicamente, la evidencia em-
pírica muestra que la probabilidad de recibir formación en la empresa es ma-
yor entre aquellos trabajadores con menor probabilidad esperada de salir de
ella. Por lo tanto, parece que las empresas ofrecen formación selectivamente.
En este trabajo se analiza empíricamente en qué medida este problema de
endogeneidad produce una correlación espuria entre formación y movilidad
laboral. Usando datos españoles del European Community Household Pa-
nel, se presentan estimaciones que ignoran este sesgo de selección y se com-
paran con los resultados obtenidos cuando dicho sesgo es tenido en cuenta.
En general, los resultados muestran una correlación negativa entre forma-
ción y movilidad laboral, aunque sólo para los trabajadores despedidos, no
para los que abandonan la empresa de manera voluntaria. Sin embargo, una
vez que se tiene en cuenta el problema de endogeneidad, el efecto negativo
deja de ser significativo en todos los casos.
Palabras clave: formación en el trabajo, rotación laboral, movilidad la-
boral.
Clasificación JEL: M53.
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